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1 
 Executive summary 
 
This evaluation was carried out at the request of HEFCE on its initiative to strengthen 
Chinese studies in English universities. The stimulus for the initiative was the perceived 
demand, as a result of increasing UK/China business, for graduates with Chinese language 
skills and business-related knowledge. Funding of some £5m was directed mainly to seven 
higher education institutions over a five year period in support of the initiative. 
 
We found that the initiative had produced mixed results. Some universities had developed 
expanded Chinese studies programmes which are recruiting well, leading to increased 
research output, and which generally show signs of prospering into the future. The additional 
funding assisted internal university restructurings to create new, cross-disciplinary groupings 
to deliver the programmes and research. In other cases, though, rather little has been achieved 
in relation to the funds provided. 
 
We suggest that the initiative's conception and design incorporated a number of weaknesses 
which, in part, led to the difficulties that some universities encountered. The demand for 
postgraduate places in Chinese studies (“the major immediate need”, as HEFCE 99/35 put it) 
was assumed to exist on the basis of limited data. In fact, all universities have found 
recruitment more or less difficult; and the postulated link with increased UK/China trade has 
not (so far, at least) been shown to exist to any major extent. Universities' bids in relation to 
anticipated student numbers were mainly over-optimistic, perhaps in response to the 
optimistic tone of HEFCE's reports and circulars. 
 
The design of the initiative, requiring universities to bid for funds simultaneously, meant that 
learning from the successes and failures of others could not occur; that market niches were 
hard to develop; and that sudden increases in the demand for staff and the provision of student 
places occurred which were unhelpful for good institutional management. Future initiatives of 
this kind should be designed so as to provide market signals to suppliers. 
 
The development of the database of China experts, directly funded by HEFCE, has produced 
limited benefits. It is hard to see what it offers that is significantly superior to what would be 
found from searching individual university “experts” sites. 
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 HEFCE's overall management of the programme correctly placed maximum responsibility on 
institutional managements, and, once the initial bidding process was complete, did not place 
particular burdens on them. 
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 1 Background to the study 
 
1.1 Universitas was invited in May 2004 to tender for an evaluation of HEFCE’s Chinese 
Studies and Minority Subjects initiatives. The Minority Subjects evaluation is the subject of a 
separate report. 
 
1.2 The Chinese Studies initiative arose from a 1999 review group report of Chinese 
studies in the UK ‘Review of Chinese Studies’ (HEFCE 99/09). This report concluded that 
China now represented an unprecedented challenge and opportunity for UK business, in 
particular, and that as a result there would be an increase in demand for people with Chinese 
language skills and understanding of Chinese business, economic, politics, and cultures. This 
demand should be met, the report proposed, by developments in higher education, in 
particular through measures “to stabilise and embed provision” in a limited number of 
existing university centres of Chinese studies. 
 
1.3 As a result, HEFCE formulated a programme, the Chinese Studies initiative, which, 
after competitive bidding, allocated sums of £150,000 a year for five years, plus additional 
library funding, to the seven existing main centres of Chinese studies: the Universities of 
Cambridge, Durham, Leeds, Newcastle, Oxford, Sheffield, and the School of Oriental and 
African Studies. The main activities were to be the provision of postgraduate conversion 
programmes, aimed at people without degree-level Chinese language, which was to be taught 
together with another subject. 
 
1.4 The objective of the initiative was for each beneficiary institution to build student and 
staff numbers, library resources, and research activity, in order to strengthen or create units 
which would continue to make an impact beyond the five-year period of funding. Funding 
was also provided for the establishment and operation of a database of China experts, to make 
it easier for non-specialists to find the advice they needed about China. 
 
1.5 The terms of reference of the evaluation were, in relation to the objectives of the 
initiative, to identify 
• its major benefits 
• what could have been done differently 
• what could have been improved 
• what worked well 
• what are the lessons to learn 
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 • was the accountability regime proportionate? 
 
 
2 Our approach 
 
2.1 We collected data on the planning and management of the initiative from HEFCE’s 
files. We then approached each institution for current data on their student numbers and other 
matters, and arranged to visit each of them. Our visits to the institutions concerned took place 
between August and October 2004, and each involved interviews with the academic, 
managerial and other staff concerned. Where possible, we also met students on the 
programme, or who had recently graduated from it. We are grateful to the staff and students 
concerned for their assistance. We also appreciate the written submissions from, or interviews 
with, the Universities’ China Committee in London, the China-Britain Business Council and 
the British Association for Chinese Studies.  
 
2.2 Resources did not permit us to visit institutions which had submitted unsuccessful 
bids under the initiative, nor those which since 1999 have developed, or are developing, 
Chinese studies without special HEFCE support, notably the Universities of Nottingham and 
Bristol. (Nottingham falls into both categories.) This would form a useful supporting study, 
examining the extent to which Chinese studies have developed in these settings and thus 
providing a comparative perspective on the HEFCE-funded developments considered here. 
 
 
3 General observations 
 
3.1 Our overall conclusion is that this programme achieved mixed results. It achieved its 
primary objective of quite quickly expanding the provision of postgraduate conversion 
courses in Chinese language with another subject. The universities which received funding 
under the programme used it effectively, generally displaying organisational efficiency and 
flexibility in planning and implementing the new provision. A range of courses was 
developed, with varied modes of provision, academic specialisations, and fee levels. The 
pluralistic strengths of UK higher education were well-exhibited. HEFCE management of the 
programme was appropriately “light touch”, and did not place undue burdens on the 
institutions taking part. Given the time-frame within which the study was conducted, over the 
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 summer period, our contacts with students and “end-users” were relatively limited: however, 
the feedback that we did receive on course design and quality was strongly positive. 
 
3.2 The initiative channelled just over £5m into the seven institutions (though the full 
cost of the expanded provision was higher, as institutions in effect supplemented the grant 
through overhead costs). But student numbers on the programmes were, and remain, 
relatively small: the unit costs of producing these graduates are therefore high. Though the 
point is strictly beyond our remit, it is hard to believe that such small numbers of graduates 
will have a noticeable impact on the UK’s ability to do business with China in the foreseeable 
future. Nor were there clear signs of actual demand from business for such graduates: most 
are not, it seems, working for UK firms on China-related matters. (This is not of course to say 
that they are not making useful contributions in other areas.) Also, while the programme as 
designed was well-managed by all concerned, there were ways we think the programme 
design overall could have been improved.  
 
3.3 Only two institutions, Leeds and SOAS, are recruiting more than 20+ FTE students 
on their new programmes. Even these levels are below those predicted in their bids: SOAS 
estimated recruitment of 55 students by 2002-03, compared with the 38 actually achieved a 
year later (the majority of whom are overseas students). Cambridge and Sheffield have come 
reasonably close to meeting their targets for 2003-04. Oxford exceeded its target of 10, 
recruiting 11 students. The other institutions are recruiting well below the levels they 
predicted in their bids: Newcastle, for example, predicted a build-up to 16 full-time masters 
students plus 28 diploma students: latest figures show 5 students recruited. 
 
3.4 Generally, we are not convinced that this programme represented the right way to 
expand Chinese studies in the UK. A sudden injection of cash into a small (in terms of staff 
and student numbers) subject area, to be spent within a tight timescale, is likely to lead to 
inefficient development. The individual choices made by the universities before the 
introduction of the initiative, not to expand their Chinese provision significantly, seems to 
have been shown to have been largely a sensible one, considered in terms of student demand. 
A smaller and slower expansion - perhaps one with about half of the new places provided - 
might have offered better value for money.  
 
3.5 There is perhaps here a wider point about centrally-planned interventions in an 
essentially market-focused system. Expansion of provision in one field by a planned 
intervention may generate some new demand, as has happened in this case. But central 
intervention usually sits uneasily in an otherwise market-oriented system, as suppliers, here 
 6
 the universities, attempt to cope with conflicting messages about demand. In this case, it is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that a misallocation of resources has occurred as a result of the 
interpretation of these conflicting messages by the universities concerned. The new funding 




4 Organisation of the programme 
 
4.1 The theoretical model underlying the organisation of the programme was, it seems, 
that of firms operating in a competitive market. By asking a selection of contractors to tender, 
the client in this environment is more likely to obtain the least-cost, highest-quality product 
(or at least, a satisfactory trade-off between the two). But we suggest that the conditions of a 
competitive market hardly applied in this case: the costs of all the contractors are very similar 
and in the short-run (as here) effectively fixed; barriers to entry to the market are high; 
demand is limited and relatively price-inelastic; and scope for innovation in design and 
production is at best marginal. Moreover, and crucially, the design of the programme meant 
that individual suppliers lacked the information about supply and demand which would 
normally be available in a competitive market.  
 
4.2 The programme would, it seems to us, have worked more effectively if it had been 
designed to allow signals on supply and demand to guide contractors: this would, however, be 
incompatible with the simple tendering model adopted. 
 
4.3 As a result, the overall organisation of the programme was widely considered by the 
universities taking part to be unsatisfactory in several respects. The criticisms arose mainly 
from the fact that all the universities involved were required to start their programmes at more 
or less the same time. This meant that there was a sudden, unprecedented, upturn in the 
demand for suitable academic staff, as all the universities needed to recruit from the same 
rather small talent pool - even allowing for the global nature of the academic profession 
(certainly this element of it). We received differing views on the question of staff recruitment: 
some universities had difficulties, others experienced no problems. This may relate to the 
standards demanded in different universities. 
 
4.4 Similarly, potential students found themselves suddenly confronted with a larger 
number of masters programmes, albeit with rather similar structures and contents, where few 
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 had previously existed. It is not therefore surprising that student recruitment for all institutions 
was difficult in the early years, until the market became somewhat more developed. It remains 
extremely circumscribed. 
 
4.5 The simultaneous start meant that there was little scope for the Chinese departments 
involved to learn from each other's successes and failures and thus to proceed more 
effectively. 
 
4.6 These difficulties could have at least partly overcome in various ways. The 
programme could have had a staggered start, with universities beginning their programmes at 
intervals of say two years. (The later starters would benefit from a more developed student 
market, and by being able to learn from the experiences of the earlier starters, arguably 
offsetting the advantage of the pioneers being able to establish themselves with fewer 
competitors.) Or some form of staged, open bidding process would have allowed universities 
to see what others were proposing, and to develop their own bids differently as a result. In any 
event, any similar future programme should aim to compensate for the lack of information for 
bidders created by the absence of market signals. 
 
4.7 Another view put to us was that the available resources had been spread too thinly, 
and that it would have been better to concentrate resources on building up a few, world-class 
centres of excellence, or even a single national centre. It was argued that this applied 
particularly to library resources, where the cost of materials (the example of the Chinese 
regional gazetteers - the statistical yearbooks - was often mentioned) meant that the UK 
lacked a single, excellent library in this field. Although in principle cooperation amongst 
libraries should mitigate this problem, through agreements on complementary acquisitions 
policies (which we were assured were in place), in practice it failed, apparently, to solve the 
problem. 
 
4.8 We were unconvinced by the argument for even greater concentration. The subject is 
already quite concentrated, considering China's growing significance, and it is open to any of 
the major universities involved to decide that they will indeed become a (even stronger) 
world-class centre, and allocate their own resources accordingly. (This appears to be 
happening in the developments in Chinese studies under way at the Universities of 
Nottingham and Bristol, not funded by this programme.) The current programme should have 
provided universities with the management information on which to base such a decision. 
Taxing the whole higher education system to develop a single (or a few) national centres 
would not only go against the grain of national higher education policy of the last decade or 
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 more, it would undermine those institutions working in an entrepreneurial way to develop 
their own strengths. Another possibility, suggested to us, was for HEFCE to have encouraged 
greater flexibility and diversity, so that each centre could have built different specialisms, 
drawing on its strengths and market intelligence. Also, perhaps undergraduate programmes 
should not have been ruled out as recipients of funding from the initiative. 
 
 
5 University academic structures 
 
5.1 The need to provide programmes which combined a traditional feature of an Oriental 
Studies department - Chinese language - with a subject usually found elsewhere in the 
university - business studies, say - led to some organisational restructuring. At Leeds, the 
Centre for China Business and Development was created as a joint venture between the 
Department of East Asian Studies and the Business School, and operates the MA programme 
in Chinese with Business. Both the East Asian Studies and the Business School academics are 
pleased with the venture, which is generating new joint research activities and other 
synergies. A broadly similar initiative occurred at SOAS, drawing on University of London 
business school expertise from nearby Birkbeck College. 
 
5.2 The University of Durham in August 2004 merged its Department of East Asian 
Studies with political science and area studies work to form a new School of Government and 
International Relations, which incorporates the pre-existing Centre for Contemporary Chinese 
Studies. The HEFCE-funded staff had been appointed to work on Chinese studies in the 
departments of Politics and Business Studies, so the merger has not affected them or their 
programmes directly, with Chinese language teaching now coming from the Language 
Centre. However, the merger means that courses containing only Chinese language and area 
studies have now closed. 
 
5.3 At other universities, however, no restructuring took place, but collaboration was 
developed between the lead department with the China expertise and departments of 
economics, politics, history and so on. In some such cases, new academic posts were jointly 
funded between the collaborating departments (as at Oxford, for example), or specialist posts 
were established in the lead department (as at Cambridge and Sheffield). Of course, many 
undergraduate and postgraduate programmes are delivered in a perfectly satisfactory way on 
this basis, though it is probably marginally less likely to lead to research collaboration and 
other academic developments. We heard reports that at Cambridge, the collaboration between 
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 the Faculty of Oriental Studies and the other faculties involved in joint teaching was 
sometimes less than satisfactory, apparently because of a lack of “ownership” of the new joint 




6 Student demand for the programmes 
 
6.1 After a slow start, some of the programmes are now recruiting satisfactorily, with 
students of a generally good calibre, according to the academics involved. Others, however, 
are doing rather poorly, notably at Newcastle, Sheffield (except the distance-learning version) 
and Cambridge. Fee levels are a disincentive, especially where fees well above the usual 
postgraduate level are charged - as at Cambridge, for example. The fee levels tend to lead to a 
substantial drop-out between the stage of applicants being accepted and starting the course. 
These problems are exacerbated to some extent by the costs of placements in China (including 
travel), which have to be paid by the students. Despite lower living costs in China, there will 
normally be net additional expenditure involved. Further, a substantial China placement tends 
to lengthen the programme, and so the period when students are foregoing earnings; though of 
course it may enhance longer-run job prospects. 
 
6.2 Some universities would have liked the programme to have offered scholarships to 
students, to enable them to recruit able applicants unable to fund themselves. 
 
6.3 Student motivation for joining the programmes varied considerably, though 
unsurprisingly a passion for China often figured. The desire for a business career is not 
wholly absent, but, from our enquiries, did not appear to be a widespread or driving 
motivation. It is in any case more likely that someone with this motivation would have 
pursued an MBA or similar route. 
 
6.4 Significant numbers of non-UK and non-EU students are being recruited to these 
programmes, including students from mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. While some 
of these students may of course go on to work for UK companies doing business with China, 
this is not, we think, the student profile that the designers of the programme probably had in 
mind.  
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 7 Demand by employers for students from the programmes 
 
7.1 We were not specifically asked to review the information which led to the programme 
being adopted; however, as much of what followed was determined by that information, we 
feel that it is appropriate to comment.  
 
7.2 The assumption of the report (HEFCE 99/09) on which the programme was based 
was that UK companies operating in China would be keen to recruit graduates from the kind 
of masters programmes which have been developed. In fact, we found little evidence to 
support this proposition. Of course, a UK or other Western company operating in China 
would, other things being equal, no doubt rather recruit a graduate who spoke Chinese rather 
than one who did not. But the dominant trend in Western companies operating in China, we 
were told, is towards localisation, supported by the fast-growing supply of able, young 
Chinese graduates with excellent English language skills and more knowledge about the West 
generally. Companies increasingly, it appears, are preferring to send these people for 
advanced training at a Western university, rather than to recruit Westerners. Salary levels, and 
the advantages of being an insider when doing business in China, were quoted as reasons. We 
were given the example of McKinsey & Co, which is recruiting for its Chinese operations 
almost exclusively from Chinese nationals with Western postgraduate qualifications.  
 
7.3 There is of course a continuing demand for Westerners with Chinese language skills 
and an understanding of Chinese methods, not least to explain matters to other Westerners in 
terms they would understand. There is, however, probably not a direct relationship between 
the growth of UK/China business and the demand for graduates of the programmes involved 
here. We found very few cases of UK graduates being employed by Western firms operating 
in China; and where they were, it was not always obvious that they would not have been so 
employed regardless of their degree type, as the employer's demand seemed to be either for 
generalist postgraduate-level skills, or for a subject specialisation such as economics. An 
applicant with a demanding postgraduate qualification from a leading UK university would be 
welcomed by most international organisations seeking management talent, regardless of the 
specific content of their degree. 
 
7.4 We were impressed by the distance learning initiative at Sheffield, which has 
recruited well from people who continue in employment, though not necessarily in jobs 
relating to China. However, other part-time versions of programmes, for example at 
Newcastle, have not fared well, perhaps because they relied too much on face-to-face 
teaching. We were surprised by the lack of targeting of employers who have business with 
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 China; even the successful distance learning programme had not deliberately been marketed 
through employers (rather with individual potential students). There was a general lack of 
organised information about destinations of graduates (though this is always notoriously 
difficult information to obtain), and of alumni databases. 
 
 
8 Staff recruitment and the UK pool of experience 
 
8.1 We have mentioned that the sudden surge in demand for Chinese specialists 
occasioned by the start of this programme is said to have somewhat unbalanced the supply 
and demand equation in the academic labour market in this field. While some universities 
delayed filling posts by a year or so because of an unsatisfactory field of applicants, this does 
not appear to have been a major problem in other than the very short-run. This was in part 
because all universities drew significantly on Chinese nationals to fill the new posts - as 
language specialists, but also in fields such as business and economics. Academics from 
Western countries other than the UK were recruited as well.  
 
8.2 This reflects the international nature of the academic labour market at its higher end, 
and casts some doubt on how realistic it is to think of the UK academic labour market as an 
entity. There is little in the background documents of this initiative which gives a sense of this 
international dimension. No doubt a further substantial expansion of UK university provision 
in this field could be supported by further international recruitment, which would also send 
market signals to actual and potential postgraduate students in the UK and abroad, so 
increasing future supply. The current programme has, apparently, caused some students, who 
began their studies for instrumental reasons, to decide that they would like to pursue a more 
academic approach, and it is believed that a number of potential academic staff members will 
result. At Oxford, for example, five graduates from the programme are undertaking advanced 
study in the field. 
 
8.3 A further point raised was that, while it is possible to recruit Chinese nationals to 
teach in UK universities - and the pool of suitable applicants will undoubtedly grow - a quasi-
security issue is involved. One element of this, it is said, is that top executives of Western 
companies want to discuss issues with a Western expert, not a Chinese national, however 
well-informed. Another is of course security in the strict sense, that Western governments will 
generally want their own nationals, or those of allies, to perform sensitive tasks requiring 
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 skills in Chinese. This, essentially, is the basis for creating a home-grown cadre of China 
experts, rather than relying on the market to provide academics of Chinese nationality. 
 
 
9 ChinaExperts database 
 
9.1 The Review of Chinese Studies (HEFCE 99/09) recommended that a specialist China 
experts database should be established, on the grounds that it was difficult to identify those 
with particular expertise, as they might not be in a major Chinese studies department. We 
have not seen the evidence for these suppositions. A searchable database of experts on China, 
funded by HEFCE at a cost of some £62,000, was therefore established, after a tendering 
process, by the Community of Science (CoS). CoS maintains COS Expertise, ‘a richly 
featured knowledge management system for individuals and institutions, containing more 
than 480,000 first-person profiles of researchers from over 1,600 institutions worldwide’, 
http://expertise.cos.com/, which is accessible only by subscription. ChinaExperts is a subset 
of profiles from that database, of people in UK HEIs with China-related expertise. Access to 
that subset is from a separate website, www.chinaexperts.org.uk. Access is free of charge, at 
least for five years, whereafter CoS has reserved the right to make a charge for access to 
ChinaExperts outside the academic community. As the successor of BEST (British Expertise 
in Science and Technology), CoS has long-established mechanisms for collecting and 
updating profiles for UK academics, and HEIs are increasingly keen to market the expertise 
of their staff, through this and other channels. We have examined aspects of the database and 
have obtained some use data from CoS. 
 
9.2 The number of profiles have increased from an initial 628 identified at the time of 
tender in March 2000 to 688 in October 2004. Registered users number 742 (a number which 
only increases, as dormant registrations are not deleted). Site visits and page views (i.e. 
profiles retrieved) between October 2003 and September 2004 - excluding an unexplained 
spike in August - averaged between 388 and 740 per month.  
 





 10 The language component 
 
10.1 We were rather surprised by the differing approaches taken towards the language 
component of the funded programmes. Competence in the Chinese language is, after all, 
supposed to be the defining characteristic of the graduates of these programmes. The most 
usual programme structure was of two years full-time study, including a significant period of 
time at a Chinese university, mainly studying language. This, we were told, enabled 
motivated students to master spoken and written Chinese sufficiently to conduct reasonably 
complex conversations, read newspapers and reports, and so on. This is in addition to the 
study of the other component of the programme: business, politics, and so on. Two-year 
versions, where originally planned, have however sometimes been revealed by marketing 
information to be unattractive to students, due to fees and lost income. 
 
10.2 Other programmes offered a one-year programme, again with Chinese language and 
another subject, and claimed to achieve a broadly similar level of language achievement. 
Some of these programmes were aimed at students with some prior Chinese language 
experience, while others set their sights lower by concentrating on teaching spoken Chinese, 
with a small written component. It is not our task to adjudicate on these different approaches, 
even if we were competent to do so. It is, however, striking that such different approaches 
have been taken.  
 
10.3 The conclusion we draw (see the comments on employer demand, in section 7 above) 
is that “getting by” in Chinese is perfectly acceptable for many jobs, and provides a basis for 
further learning, if required. This suggests that employers do not select applicants for their 
language skills as such, but, arguably, for demonstrating their ability to cope with a 
demanding postgraduate course of broad relevance to the employer. This is the basis for much 





11.1 Research activity has been stimulated by the initiative, although the assessment of it 
is outside our competence. The fact that all the developments have been in traditionally 
research-intensive universities has been significant. Both the recruitment of academic staff 
with new interests, and interdisciplinary developments, have stimulated research activity. In 
the case of Leeds, for example, the enhanced link with the Business School is said to have led 
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 to new business-focused research on China; though it is impossible to judge whether the 





12.1 The extra funding for library materials has, as far as we can tell, been usefully 
employed in strengthening collections in each centre. We have already mentioned some of the 
issues involved. It is difficult for non-specialists to form a view on the right balance between 
library collaboration and the creation of independent centres. We were told that Chinese 
subject librarians did pursue shared collection development policies; it seems to us likely, 
though, that this could be taken much further. 
 
12.2 It is not clear to us why separate library funding was provided, rather than leaving 
each university to decide on the appropriate apportionment between staff and other support 
costs. The approach of the Chinese Studies Funding Advisory Group on library acquisitions 
appeared to us to take an excessively top-down view: we suggest that it is inappropriate for a 
central body to “advise on where [particular items of]…material should be located” for 
example. It appears also that HEFCE allowed itself to be drawn too much into the detail of 
negotiations over the China Academic Journals Database, when there was more relevant 





13.1 In most cases - Cambridge and Newcastle being notable exceptions - the university 
has made a commitment to continue the work begun by the initiative through core funding. It 
has been convinced of the value of the programme, in terms of student demand (even if this is 
below what was originally estimated), research potential, and general scholarly achievement. 
The HEFCE initiative has, in these terms, succeeded in changing universities' priorities in a 
direction intended to serve a significant national goal. 
 
13.2 We asked universities why, if these benefits were now apparent, the university itself 
had not acted earlier to develop the activities in question, on the advice of its own China 
experts or from other sources. In most cases, the answer was that demand was not apparent 
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 and investment was considered to be too speculative; and that organisational friction 
prevented the change. The new HEFCE money both reduced the perceived risk, and acted as 
the vital lubricant to allow change to occur. Once implemented, the changes were widely seen 
as beneficial, and therefore sustainable. 
 
13.3 On the basis of limited data, we think it likely that, taking university overheads into 
account, the individual universities contributed to the programme by approximately 15% of 
full costs. It is important to bear in mind, then, that the full cost of the programme was 




 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
1 Centrally-planned interventions of the kind this initiative represents, in otherwise 
market-driven systems, may lead to a misallocation of resources. To minimise this 
risk, the design of the initiative should be such as to allow market signals to be 
provided to suppliers. This will normally be incompatible with a simple tendering 
model. 
 
2 The demand information upon which the initiative was planned was weak: both 
student demand and employer demand appear more limited than was suggested. 
 
3 However, the initiative has led to expanded teaching and research in Chinese studies, 
some of which is likely to be sustainable. To that extent, the initiative has succeeded 
in its overall aim. 
 
4 The global and interdependent nature of academic and student markets should be 
more carefully considered in this type of planning. 
 
5 We question the usefulness of providing earmarked library funding, rather than 
allowing institutions to decide on the appropriate split in their own circumstances 
between staff, library, and other costs of developing new programmes. 
 
6 We doubt the cost-effectiveness of establishing a subscription-only database of China 
experts, when universities' own websites, and internet searching more generally, are 
becoming ever-more sophisticated. 
 
7 A further study should be conducted on the development of Chinese studies since 
1999 in institutions which did not receive support under this initiative. Such 




Annex 1:  Summary of Student Recruitment under the Chinese studies 
programme 
Part-time students are shown as 0.5 FTE. Note that ‘overseas’ students are those paying fees 
at the overseas rate, normally by reason of not being residents of the European Union. The 






































Cambridge 4 0 7 1 9 1 11 4 n/a n/a 
Durham 4.5 0.5 5 1 7 3 9.5 6 n/a n/a 
Leeds 
 
10 1 13 2 24 11 20 8 n/a n/a 
Newcastle - - - - 1 - 5 1 n/a n/a 
Oxford 0 0 4 2 3 1 11 5 n/a n/a 
Sheffield 1 1 - - 7 2 6.5 1.5 14.5 5 
SOAS 
 
- - 17 9 25.5 18 38 22 n/a n/a 
Total 19.5 2.5 46 15 76.5 36 101 47.5   
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